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THE FIRST PHASE OF DESTRUCTION
KILLING THE SOUTHERN PLAINS BUFFALO,

1790~1840

PEKKA HAMALAINEN

The eradication of the vast bison herds from
the North American Great Plains is one of the
oldest topics in western history and, recently,
also one of the most popular. Drawing ideas
and methodologies from ecology and zoology,
historians have revealed in the 1990s an entirely new anatomy of the destruction. According to the new interpretation, the great
slaughter of the 1870s merely delivered a
clinching blow to herds that had already been
weakened in a number of ways. Concentrating

on the Southern Plains, Dan Flores has concluded that large-scale dying may have begun
as early as 1840, when a peace among
Comanche, Kiowa, Plains Apache, Cheyenne,
and Arapahoe opened the previously contested
hunting grounds for Native hunters. A severe
drought in 1846, along with exotic bovine
diseases and Euro- American disturbance,
brought about a full-blown crisis by mid-century. Following Flores's lead, Elliott West has
revealed a similar development on the Central Plains, although he argued that the principal catalyst of the crisis was a zoological
phenomenon known as "species packing." In
the 1840s, thousands of white overlanders and
their horses, oxen, cattle, and sheep swarmed
onto the already crowded Central Plains,
throwing off the delicate ecological equilibrium. Basically, there were not enough resources for everyone-the Euro-Americans,
Indians, domestic herds, and bison.!
By now, these revisionist studies have become the new canon of bison ecology, which
is not necessarily what the authors had had in
mind. Both Flores and West intended their
essays to be broadly conceived, at least partly
hypothetical works that would encourage us
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FIG . 1. Carl Bodmer (1809-1893), Indians Hunting the Bison, 1845, engraving, 6 1/8 X 7 15 /16 in. Courtesy
of Great Plains Art Collection, University of Nebraska. Gift of Leon McGoogan, M.D.

to rethink some of the fixed notions about
the buffalo's demise. 2 However, New Western historians, eager to promote studies supporting their theses, hurried to sanction the
two essays. Touching upon such themes as
complexity of Euro-American takeover and
interrelatedness of environmental and economic processes, Flores and West's writing
resonated so perfectly with the core paradigms
of the New Western History movement that
few had the patience to wait for affirmative
studies. 3 This impatience is problematic because Flores and West's studies contain a number of unresolved questions that have to be
answered before they can be accepted as the
new standard of bison ecology.
The first question involves geographic
scope. Flores's essay focuses on the regions
immediately south of the upper Arkansas Ba-

sin, and West's study concentrates to the areas immediately to the north. Both are thus
essentially geographically focused case studies, models for more inclusive further research.
The second question involves timing, the temporal trajectory of destruction. Flores and West
designated the 1840s as the critical period,
witnessing the expansion of indigenous hunting following the 1840 detente, swelling overland traffic, and a prolonged dry spell. Both
emphasize that starvation was Widespread by
1850, suggesting that the bison populations
had declined by several hundred thousand, if
not by millions, by that time. But is such a
drastic decline conceivable in a mere decade?
After all, drought did not begin until 1846,
and the five Native groups involved in the
1840 detente can be documented as killing
only slightly more than 100,000 animals a year.

THE FIRST PHASE OF DESTRUCTION

According to John W. Whitfield, the agent of
the upper Arkansas, the 11,470 Comanche,
Kiowa, Plains Apache, Cheyenne, and Arapahoe living on the river basin were killing
about 112,000 bison annually.4 Clearly, there
seems to be a component missing in the FloresWest modeL
This component, I believe, is a longer time
perspective: the bison decline began on the
Southern Plains much earlier than has been
previously thought. It is possible that the herds
began shrinking there as early as the late 1780s
or early 1790s, leading into a perceptible reduction by the 1810s. When David G. Burnet,
later the president of the Republic of Texas,
visited the Comanche in the Brazos River valley in 1818, he reported that "It has been remarked that the number of Buffaloes that
annually reach the regions inhabited by the
Comanchees [sic], has sensibly diminished
within a few years." By the 1820s, the
Comanche and Kiowa increased their raiding
in Texas, New Mexico, and northern Mexico,
apparently because declining hunting opportunities forced them to diversify their economies. Finally, by the early 1830s, the herds
were vanishing at an alarming rate all across
the Texas Plains. Writing in 1833 at Fort
Gibson on the Arkansas River, about thirty
miles to the west of the present-day ArkansasOklahoma border, one observer stated that
the bison "have receded, it would seem, one
hundred miles westward in the last ten years;
and it may be safely assured that thirty or forty
years hence, they will not be found nearer to
us than the spurs of the Rocky Mountains."5
I suggest in this essay, besides a new temporal trajectory, a causality that differs significantly from Flores and West's ecological
models. Not the result of environmental degradation alone, the early decline of bison was
triggered by large-scale overhunting, which
stemmed from indigenous population growth,
intensified subsistence and market hunting,
and rapid commercial expansion. Although
some of the ecological factors that Flores and
West discuss-particularly grazing competition from growing herds of domesticated and
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wild horses-were at work already in the late
eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries,
the early diminution of the Southern Plains
bison population was primarily the result of
excessive human utilization. Finally, I present
a modified geographic dynamic. The decline
of bison did not begin in the Arkansas Basin
but on the Texas Plains, at the center of
Comancherfa. There, the Comanche fashioned
in the late eighteenth and early nineteenth
centuries an attractive but inherently fragile
economic regime that rested on a large-scale,
and ultimately excessive, exploitation of the
bison.
HUMAN PREDATION AND THE SOUTHERN
PLAINS BUFFALO

A central postulate still influencing the
thinking of many Plains historians is the idea
that the Indians lived in a hunter's paradise
where enormous buffalo herds formed a virtually bottomless pool of protein, fat, hides, and
other crucial resources. So vast were the herds,
the argument goes, that Indians could harvest
them without the slightest concern for
overhunting or ecological mismanagement. To
be sure, scholars have chronicled and scrutinized the momentous effects of climatic shifts,
droughts, and killer winters on bison populations,6 but few have paused to consider the
fundamental, underlying question: why exactly
were the environmental changes so detrimental to the bison? Is it possible that the safe
margin for human exploitation, the difference
between the bison's ability to propagate and
humans' potential to kill, was narrower than
has been assumed, making the herds vulner'able to environmental shifts?
A closer look suggests that the Plains Indians' celebrated bison-hunting economy rested
on a rather shaky ecological foundation. The
basic problem was a precarious balance between the bison's reproduction rate and human exploitation; the Plains may have been a
hunter's paradise, but only for so many people.
In a seminal study, William Brown has estimated that the roughly 240,000 square miles

104

GREAT PLAINS QUARTERLY, SPRING 2001

of luscious mid- and shortgrass steppe that
comprised Comancherfa could support about
7 million bison. Derived from range-use efficiency calculations and United States census
data for livestock, this number is notably
smaller than most earlier estimates that were
based on anecdotal historical documents. Even
more challenging is Brown's estimate on the
maximum number of animals the Indians could
kill annually without depleting the herds.
Assuming a balanced sex ratio, with breeding
cows amounting to 45 percent of the total, he
projected that the herds increased by 567,000
a year; he then estimated the annual loss to
nonhuman causes-natural mortality, diseases,
accidents, fire, and wolves-at 7.5 percent, or
525,000 animals. The crucial difference-the
safe yearly margin for human exploitation-is
thus 42,000 animals. 7 This figure is strikingly
low, and it suggests a provocative possibility:
the Southern Plains Indians may have been
killing buffalo at an unsustainable rate for fifty
years before the troubled 1840s began. s
The eighteenth century was one of the most
chaotic periods in the history of the Southern
Plains, witnessing the great Comanche onslaught from the Rocky Mountains and the
subsequent decline of the Apache, who had
previously dominated the region. This turbulence makes estimates of Native populations virtually impossible; the contemporary
observers were simply too busy keeping track
of the rapidly shifting tribal map to make reliable population estimates. It is relatively
clear, however, that the Comanche steadily
increased their numbers until, by the 1780s,
there were at least 8,000 of them along and
south of the Arkansas Basin. In 1786, for example, Spanish officials estimated that the
Western Comanche, that is, the Comanche
bands living near New Mexico, numbered between 6,000 and 7,000. This figure does not
include the Eastern Comanche, who were estimated in 1785 to comprise ten or twelve
rancherfas, each of which probably contained
a few hundred people. Eager to muster enough
warriors to fend off the Apache and the encroaching Spanish and Osage, the Comanche

maintained a relatively stable population
base until the 1840s, when diseases, habitat
destruction, and starvation finally began to
cut into their numbers.9 In addition to the
estimated 8,000 Comanche, the Southern
Plains accommodated some 1,800 Kiowa and
Plains Apache, who in the 1780s pushed south
of the Arkansas and gradually forged an alliance with the Comanche, who had been momentarily weakened by smallpox and needed
allies to bolster their military power. 1O In effect, the Comanche opened their northern
border to gain strength to block the Osage in
the east and the Spanish and Apache in the
west and south.
In all, then, there were approximately
10,000 full-time hunters drawing on approximately 7 million bison on the Southern Plains
between 1790 and 1840. Fully mounted, they
were able to exploit the herds to the maximum, employing a new and remarkably efficient killing method: the mounted bison
chase. In a typical chase, the hunters surrounded a bison herd on horseback, riding
alongside the animals to keep them in place,
and firing arrows into selected young cows. A
skillful hunter could easily kill three animals
on a single chase, and a communal hunt could
yield as many as 300 carcasses in one day. 11
Indeed, so productive was the mounted chase
that all Southern Plains hunters developed a
singular dependency on the bison. They relied on the buffalo for clothing, shelter, and
food and eschewed farming, preferring to barter surplus meat and hides with neighboring
horticulturists for corn and vegetables. It has
been estimated that specialized hunters
needed a yearly average of six bison per person to meet their subsistence demands of meat
(about five pounds per person a day) and
hides,12 which suggests that the late-eighteenth- and early-nineteenth-century Southern Plains hunters were consuming about
60,000 animals a year-18,000 above the
safe margin. Since this deficit kept accumulating year after year, the Comanche and their
Kiowa and Plains Apache allies may have
drained the Southern Plains bison population
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FIG. 2. William de la Montagne Cary (1840-1922), Indians Killing Buffaloes in the Missouri River, 1874,
engraving, 9 x 13 9/ /6 in. Courtesy of Great Plains Art Collection, University of Nebraska. Gift of Vivian
Kiechel.

by almost 1 million by 1840, the supposed
outset of the great dying.
Subsistence hunting was the primary cause
of the early diminution of the Southern Plains
bison population, but commercial hunting
dramatically expedited the decline. Conventional wisdom asserts that the eighteenthand early-nineteenth-century Southern Plains
was not a major trading region-historians
have been much more impressed with the
Northern Plains commercial systems, particularly the great Mandan, Hidatsa, and Arikara
trade center on the upper Missouri Riverbut this portrayal is now coming under increasing criticism. According to the new
interpretation, the Comanche, far from being
the one-dimensional warrior society depicted
in the early studies, relied in their foreign
policy more on trade and diplomacy than on
war and raiding. By the late eighteenth cen-

tury, they controlled an imposing commercial
network, which featured distinctive trade centers and multiple links that mantled the entire lower mid-continent. Although horses and
guns would later become principal items in
Comanche trade, the early exchange revolved
heavily around subsistence goods: suffering
from a chronic carbohydrate deficiency, the
hunting-oriented Comanche purchased large
quantities of corn, vegetables, and bread with
bison products. Consequently, they provided
substantial amounts of hides, meat, and tallow for a multitude of groups-Wichita,
Kansa, Iowa, Pawnee, French, British, Americans, Spaniards, and comancheros (New Mexican traders operating on the Llano Estacado).
Commercial hunting intensified further in the
1830s, when Americans and Anglo-Texans
erected several trading posts on the Southern
Plains. 13
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By a rough estimate, the Comanche and
Kiowa produced in the late eighteenth and
early nineteenth centuries only a few thousand hides a year for exchange. 14 Although
the overall volume of market-oriented bison
hunting was limited, the hunting practices of
the Indians aggravated the damage. When
engaged in commercial hide and robe production, most Plains Indians preferred killing
two- to five-year-old cows for their more palatable meat and thinner and more easily processed skins. Moreover, the Indians did most
of their market hunting in winter when the
robes were the thickest and most valuable.
Because bison cows produce their first calves
at the age of three or four and their gestation
period usually extends from mid-July to early
April, the commercial hunting centered
heavily on pregnant cows, critically impairing
the herds' ability to maintain their numbers. 15
Commerce and markets accelerated the
bison decline also in a more indirect way: in
the late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries, the Comanchs allowed several groups
to enter and hunt in their territory. In exchange, the various Comanche bands and divisions received extensive trading privileges.
This process began with the famous 1786
Comanche-Spanish accord, in which the
Western Comanche-the J upe, Yamparika,
and Kotsoteka-received unlimited access to
New Mexico's markets and in return opened
their bison range for New Mexican bison
hunters, or ciboleros. In the early nineteenth
century, ciboleros made annual hunting expeditions to the Llano Estacado, harvesting, according to some estimates, at least 10,000
animals a season. At about the same time, the
Eastern Comanche-the Kotsoteka -formed
a trade relationship with the Wichita, who
secured hunting privileges in Comancherfa as
a part of the accord. Numbering between 3,000
and 4,000 in the early nineteenth century, the
Wichita took several thousand animals during their annual hunting expeditions, which
continued into the late 1830s.1 6 Since subsistence hunting alone had been enough to dis-

rupt the delicate equilibrium, all the killing
done by ciboleros, Wichita, and Comanche and
Kiowa commercial hunters can be classified as
overhunting. With an estimated yearly killing
rate of 20,000, they may have depleted the
bison population by 1 million by 1840, bringing the total reduction close to 2 million.
After allowing this influx of hunters into
their territory, the Comanche began to protect their herds against external pressure. They
permitted a few Lipan bands to travel and hunt
within Comancherfa in the 1810s, and their
western boundary remained porous, making it
possible for Eastern Shoshone and Ute to hunt
periodically on the Southern Plains. However,
all the others-the Cheyenne, Arapahoe, and
Osage-were kept out by force. This defensive policy had implications for the bison as
well, because it created buffer zones, contested
areas where Native hunters only reluctantly
followed their prey. Because of the low level
of exploitation, the buffer zones functioned as
effective animal preserves, shelters from human predation. Comancherfa was skirted by
two major neutral zones. One bordered the
region's northern perimeter, keeping the
Cheyenne and Arapahoe from pushing south
of the Arkansas, and the second dissected
Comancherfa's eastern flank, blocking the
Osage and the immigrant tribes of Indian T erritoryY
This eastern preserve vanished with a single
diplomatic move in 1835 at Camp Holmes,
when the Comanche granted the Osage and
immigrant tribes access to their hunting
grounds, again in exchange for trading privileges. Although the Osage were traditionally
semihorticultural people, external pressure
had disrupted their farming cycle, forcing
them to rely increasingly on the hunt. Apparently numbering between 4,000 and 5,000,
the Osage needed at least 20,000 bison a year,
and since their own hunting grounds had become badly depleted by the 1830s, they probably harvested the bulk of their bison from
Comancherfa. The Osage principal hunting
territory lay between the upper Canadian and
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Brazos Rivers, just west of their own core territory. The greatest pressure on Comancherfa's
bison herds, however, was applied by the immigrant Indians. Not only did the most populous groups-the Cherokee, Chickasaw,
Choctaw, Creek, Delaware, and Seminoleremain active hunters after the removal, but
they also were located in the western parts of
Indian Territory, adjacent to Comancherfa.
In the late 1830s, they all hunted extensively
in Comanche territory and many maintained
permanent encampments on their principal
hunting range between the upper Canadian
and Brazos Rivers. Moreover, some of the
immigrant groups, particularly the Delawares
Kickapoo, and Shawnee, were rapidly transforming themselves into specialized bison
hunters. Given their large population, commitment to the hunt, and geographical proximity, the immigrant groups probably drained
Comancherfa's bison population by several
thousand animals a year. IS As noted earlier,
the subsistence and commercial hunting activities of the Comanche, Kiowa, Plains Apache,
Wichita, and ciboleros may have depleted the
Southern Plains bison population by almost
2 million by 1840. The additional hunting
done by the Osage and immigrant Indians after the Camp Holmes treaty may have brought
the total reduction well above 2 million by
1840, when, according to the standard view,
the large-scale bison destruction was only beginning.
This is a staggering figure that invites skepticism. However, one should bear in mind that
my purpose is not to present exact calculations but to prove a more general point; that
there was a substantial, historically significant
decline in bison numbers well before the 1840s.
Moreover, the figure matches other broad calculations on bison numbers. The prevailing
view today is that the bison numbers peaked
at 7 or 8 million animals on the Southern
Plains. Of this, white professional hunters
eliminated about 3.5 million animals during
the great slaughter of the 1870s. If we assume
that the hardships of the 1840s and 1850s
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shaved off an additional 2 million, there is
still a loss of between 1.5 and 2.5 million that
has to be accounted for. The standard explanation is that most of these animals perished
during the "big die-up" of 1867, when an intense drought scarred the region between the
Brazos and Conchos Rivers, causing widespread starvation. 19 The problem with this
interpretation is that the enormo.us magnitude of the 1867 die-up has never been verified-and probably never will be. Perhaps the
bulk of the supposed losses had occurred well
before 1867 and from a different cause: chronic
overhunting that had continued from the previous century.
DIMINISHED RANGELAND AND GRAZING
COMPETITION

Overhunting alone did not kill the Southern Plains buffalo. Two powerful and interrelated factors hastened the bison's demise:
reduction of their range and competition from
exotic species. On the surface, it would seem
that the rate of decline should have slowed
down in time, because the diminution of the
herds left more resources for the remaining
animals, increasing their fertility and reproduction rate and allowing them to compensate for the intensified human predation.
However, as ecologists point out, an organism's
maintenance and reproduction are not determined by the abundance of essential resources
but by their minimum availability.20 It was
this "rule of scarcity" that sealed the Southern
Plains bison's fate: the overall abundance of
resources may have been increasing, but this
failed to abate the decline because the minimum availability was collapsing at the same
time.
The main problem was winter survival. In
order to make it through the cold months,
bison habitually retreated into river valleys,
which provided crucial elements of survival:
reliable water, shelter against freezing winds
and blizzards, and cottonwood for emergency
foodY By the early nineteenth century, how-
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ever, suitable riverine habitats were becoming increasingly scarce. From the early 1820s
on, the Santa Fe traders took thousands of
horses, oxen, and cattle through the upper
Arkansas and Cimarron corridors each year,
exhausting the river valleys of grass and other
resources. In the 1830s the removed eastern
tribes of Indian Territory began pushing toward Comancherfa, clearing the Canadian,
Washita, and Red Rivers of the bison. In 1841
the Osage agent reported that the valleys were
so depleted that Osage hunters had to push
deep into Comanche territory. Even more serious was that the bison had to compete with
some 2 million wild mustangs for sustenance
and shelter. With an 80 percent dietary overlap and similar water requirements, bison and
mustangs competed fiercely for the shrinking
riverine resources, critically weakening each
other's chances to maintain their numbers.22
However, the most serious threat to the
bison's winter survival was posed by the Indians' rapidly growing domestic horse herds.
While the Comanche had possessed between
two and three horses per person in the 1770s
and 1780s, the estimates by the early-nineteenth-century observers ranged between three
and eight animals per capita. 23 To support all
these animals-most of which were destined
for the growing Anglo-American livestock
trade-the Comanche turned more and more
bottomland niches into herding range. Biologically, horses had no decisive advantage
over bison in grazing competition, but with
the help of their human partners they triumphed. By simply scaring off or killing the
buffaloes, the Indians reserved a growing share
of the bottomlands for themselves and their
herds. In such key sites as the upper Arkansas,
Canadian, Red, and Brazos Rivers huge horse
herds and winter camps stretched for miles,
covering all the prime locales and coercing
the bison to retreat to poorer areas with reduced carrying capaci ty. 24 Already under stress
from human predation and now denied vital
resources, the Southern Plains buffalo population lost its ability to maintain its numbers.

THE CONFLICTING MOTIVES OF THE
COMANCHE

The early diminution of the Southern Plains
bison herds was first and foremost an economic
process. The depletion began with more intense subsistence hunting, which in turn was
propelled by the Comanche desire to maintain a large population. The decline was precipitated by the influx of new hunting groups,
many of which had gained access to the Southern Plains bison by granting trading privileges
to the Comanche. The bison's fate was sealed
by the dramatic growth of the Indians' domestic horse herds, which competed with bison
for grass and water in riverine habitats. Invariably, this development, too, stemmed from
commercial considerations: the Comanche
needed large horse and mule herds to supply
thriving livestock trade. This conclusion deviates from the dominant ecological interpretations and is more in line with Andrew
Isenberg's recent argument that the near-extermination of the bison by the 1880s was a
by-product of Euro-American economic and
ecological invasion. According to Isenberg,
the encounter between Indians and EuroAmericans in the western Plains created historical agents and institutions-equestrian
Native hunters, professional white hide hunters, market-oriented robe trade-that proved
detrimental to the bison's survival. 25
Yet it would be an oversimplification to
say that the Comanche sacrificed the bison
for shortsighted commercial and economic
gain. Rather, their failure to adopt conservationist strategies stemmed from a complex
conflict of motives involving ecological, economic, military, and religious interests. It is
difficult to determine whether the Comanche
were aware that their actions-granting hunting privileges, increasing their horse herd
sizes, maintaining a large population basewere depressing the bison's numbers. Since
the Comanche spent most of the year divided
into small bands, they could not compare
their hunting experiences and conceive a co-
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ordinated resource strategy. Moreover, there
was no way to assess how badly their numerous allies were depleting Comancherfa's herds
during their frequent hunting expeditions.
Finally, it would have been virtually impossible to determine whether the scarcity of bison reflected a profound, permanent decline
or normal seasonal fluctuations. On the other
hand, at least some Comanche bands did complain that the increasing hunting pressure that
followed the Camp Holmes treaty compromised their hunting success, exhibiting an
acute understanding of the dynamic that was
eradicating the foundation of their way of
life. 26
However, whatever ecological concerns the
Comanche had, they were overshadowed by
compelling economic and military imperatives.
In the early nineteenth century, pressure on
Comancherfa was rapidly increasing. AngloTexans, Cheyenne, Arapahoe, immigrant
tribes, Osage, and Santa Fe traders all gravitated toward the Southern Plains, making it
critical for the Comanche to increase their
economic, commercial, and military power.
The Comanche needed the bison's meat and
hides for long-term survival, but in the short
run it was more important for them to have
several allies, large numbers of warriors, and
secure trade that yielded metal weapons, guns,
powder, and ammunitionY Faced with a critical strategic crisis, the Comanche had no other
option but to allow unsustainable exploitation of the bison.
It is also possible that the Comanche spiritual worldview prevented them from working
out an ecological balance. It has been argued
that the Plains Indians shared a common belief that the bison's well-being was less a matter of human predation than a sort of ritualistic
herd management: if the Indians performed
the proper bison-calling ceremonies the herds
would be renewed and the bison would return.
An integral part of this belief was a conviction that buffaloes were supernatural in origin
and infinite in numbers. According to Colonel Richard Dodge, whose information was
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admittedly secondhand, all Plains Indians
"firmly believed that the buffalo were produced
in countless numbers in a country under the
ground; that every spring the surplus swarmed,
like bees from a hive, out of great cave-like
openings to this country, which were situated
somewhere in the great 'Llano Estacado,' or
Staked Plain of Texas."28 There is no direct
evidence of the existence of such a belief
among the Comanche, but Ernest Wallace and
E. Adamson Hoebel describe a comparable
idea in their 1952 ethnology. The Comanche,
they report, believed that buffaloes would always be available if the proper rituals were
performed:
Out on the prairie might be seen the skulls
of buffalo turned so as to face the main
camp, the idea being that the guardian spirit
would direct the herd to move in the direction the skulls were facing. Sometimes when
they were ceremoniously smoking, after
puffs had been blown to the Great Spirit,
Sun, and Earth, a puff was blown to a nearby buffalo skull with a prayer that it provide the people with meat to eat and skins
for their lodges and clothing. At times they
prayed to the buffalo in general to range
where hunting would be good. 29
If such a belief existed, it may have had farreaching consequences for how the Comanche
reacted to the bison decline. While the
Comanche undoubtedly understood the dynamics of wildlife populations and the ecological and economic causes of bison mortality,
it is entirely plausible that they also believed
in the supernatural origin of the bison. Thus,
even if they realized that the bison herds were
shrinking, they could have been convinced at
the same time that there would always be buffaloes as long as there were Indians who knew
and executed the necessary rituals. This kind
of belief in nature's infinite abundance would
explain why the Comanche gradually depleted
the bison herds and undermined the foundation of their traditional way of life. Unable to
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foresee the bison's extinction, they were also
unable to adopt a conservationist policy.30
How does this model of bison decline fit
the Flores-West model? At first glance, there
seems to be no connection, for all the basic
components-interpretations of timing, spatial dynamic, and causes of the devastationare different. According to Flores' and West's
ecologically based models, large-scale decline
began on the upper Arkansas Basin in the
1840s, while my contention is that a mixture
of indigenous population growth, overkill,
and ascendance of market forces had eroded
the herds on the Texas Plains since the 1790s.
The decline centered on the Texas Plains for
a number of reasons. To begin, all the groups
that gained access to Comancherfa's bison
range in the late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries-the ciboleros, Wichita, Osage, and immigrant tribes of Indian Territory
-focused their hunting activities on a relatively narrow strip between the upper Canadian and Brazos Rivers. Second, the 1,800
Kiowa and Plains Apache who made the
Southern Plains their home in the late eighteenth century esrablished their core territory
between the Canadian and Red Rivers. Third,
Comanche commercial hunting was most intense on the Texas Plains, which were infringed in the late 1830s and 1840s with several
trading posts specializing in robe trade. Concurrently, the Comanche were intensifying
their subsistence hunting on the Texas Plains.
Pressed by a powerful Cheyenne-Arapaho bloc,
the populous Yamparika and Jupe bands abandoned the Arkansas valley in the late 1820s,
after which they concentrated their hunting
activities farther south on the already crowded
Texas Plains.
On closer inspection, however, the seemingly unconnected models merge to form a
single causal continuum, the focal point of
which was the Great Peace of 1840. Both Flores
and West argue that the diminution was set
off by the peace, which opened the previously
uncontested upper Arkansas Basin for the five
Native groups. Now, though, it appears that

the peace was not a starting point but rather a
key event in a long and complex development
that led to the demise of the Southern Plains
bison. As conditions on the Texas Plains became increasingly dangerous for bison in the
early nineteenth century, the geographic focus of bison populations gradually shifted toward the Arkansas Basin, which remained a
contested tribal zone-and thus an animal
refuge-until the Great Peace. 3! The Arkansas valley, previously designated as the starting point of bison decline, was rather the last
true sanctuary for the Southern Plains buffalo.
This also explains why the 1840 peace became so decisive. When the detente unlocked
the Arkansas, the bison had nowhere to go,
for all other spots were swarming with Native
and Euro-American hunters. The Great Peace
sounded the death knell for the Southern
Plains bison by aggravating a crisis that had
been slowly brewing for half a century.
The early diminution of bison had a profound impact on the Southern Plains Indians'
way of life. Unable to draw stable sustenance
from the dwindling herds, the Comanche
geared their economies toward pastoralism,
the only other option available for them besides hunting. The Comanche had adopted
pastoralist customs and strategies since the late
eighteenth century, when they had become
large-scale horse owners. The maintenance of
vast horse herds had forced them to modify
their annual cycle, settlement patterns, and
labor organization, which had given a distinctive pastoral quality to their culture and
economy.3Z However, it was only in the 1820s
and 1830s that the Comanche embraced the
defining characteristic of pastoralism-the
extensive use of herds for food and subsistence.
The systematic subsistence utilization began
in the 1820s, when the Comanche escalated
their raiding operations in New Mexico, Texas,
northern Mexico, and along the Santa Fe Trail.
The principal objective of these raids was to
steal horses and mules. Some of the stolen
livestock were eaten; although bison meat remained the staple of Comanche diet, horseflesh
became an important emergency food that
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helped the Comanche survive short famines.
However, most of the extra horses and mules
were exchanged for various necessities. As
the hunting opportunities deteriorated, the
Comanche bought increasing amounts of corn,
bread, blankets, tools, and other subsistence
goods from comancheros and indigenous farmers. In a word, the Comanche began evolving
into horse pastoralists who relied heavily on
domestic herds for subsistence. 33
On a larger scale, the early diminution of
bison ushered in a new era. As the herds declined, the Indians were forced to reevaluate
their economic strategies and their relations
with their neighbors. In 1790 the Southern
Plains had been a relatively safe place where
plentiful game had supported sound subsistence economies; a generation later the region had become a volatile place, marked by a
deteriorating bison ecology, shifting Native
economies, stiffening competition for diminishing resources, and increasing intercultural
violence. In Plains Indian history the period
between 1800 and 1850 is often referred to as
the classic era, the time of the formidable
mounted bison hunters, unforeseen material
prosperity, and thriving social and ritual life.
On the Southern Plains, the nineteenth century started promisingly, but a deepening ecological and economic crisis interrupted the
favorable development long before mid-century. Alarming signs were increasingly frequent, foreshadowing the full-blown crisis that
would soon follow.
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